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Typologies of Party Finance Systems:
A Comparative Study of How Countries Regulate
Party Finance and Their Institutional Foundations
David L. Wiltse, Raymond J. La Raja, Dorie E. Apollonio
ABSTRACT
This study catalogues party finance laws in multiple countries and identifies institutional factors that cor-
respond to laws countries choose to adopt. Using data from international sources, we assessed differences
in the regulation of money in elections in over 120 states. We classified countries into four types of party
finance regimes along two axes: one that reflects regulations affecting party income and a second that re-
flects rules intended to make party finance more transparent. We found that two institutional factors are
associated with the extent of government regulation in financing politics: the type of legal system and
the use of proportional representation. Our study provides a new conceptual framework to categorize
party finance regimes based on various types of regulations and the linkages between institutional factors
and the extent of regulation. This conceptual typology offers a method to assess relationships between fi-
nance systems and political outcomes.
Keywords: political finance, comparative party finance, money in elections
INTRODUCTION
S tates have experimented with various regu-lations to avoid the worst excesses of money
in politics, or at least show they are making efforts
to address public concerns. Research has rarely
sought to understand the nature and scope of these
rules across a large sample of countries (but see
van Biezen 2010; Norris and Abel van Es 2016).
With limited exceptions, studies consist of single-
country case studies and heavily emphasize public
finance laws in Western Europe (Alexander and
Federman 1989; Burnell and Ware 1998; Eisenstadt
2004; Ewing and Issacharoff 2006; Fisher and
Eisenstadt 2004; Gunlicks 1993; Heidenheimer and
Alexander 1970; Malamud and Posada Carbo´ 2005;
Williams 2000; Norris and Abel van Es 2016). A
classification system for these laws would make it
easier to organize cross-national data to evaluate
how states vary in dealing with the common chal-
lenge of financing democratic politics. Most impor-
tantly, a solid typology of party finance systems
could be used to assess associations with political
parties, party systems, corruption, and governance,
providing a common framework for analyzing
whether and how variation in party finance systems
matters for political outcomes.
Additionally, this article explores the relationship
between political institutions and party finance reg-
ulations. The vast majority of existing campaign fi-
nance narratives tend to look at short-term factors,
particularly the presence of scandals, which help
reform-minded political entrepreneurs push through
new laws and regulations (see for example, Clift and
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Fisher 2004; Scarrow 2004, 2007; Zelizer 2004).
Although scandals may trigger reforms, they do not
explain why governments institute particular kinds
of reforms or impose reforms at all. This study is
an attempt to shift from ‘‘when’’ to ‘‘what’’ of polit-
ical reforms. In other words, rather than explain the
timing of reforms, we seek to understand the under-
lying structural factors associated with specific kinds
of reforms (see for example, Hopkin 2004; Johnson
2008; Poire´ 2006; Van Biezen 2004).1 Although in-
stitutional factors are not the sole explanations for
the content of party finance laws, historical institu-
tional approaches have proven powerful in identify-
ing contemporary patterns of political organization
(e.g., Pierson 2000; Skocpol 1979) and providing
reasonable footing on which to build broader models
of political reform. Our study cannot make causal
claims about the development of finance laws be-
cause we lack time-series data to evaluate the se-
quencing of reforms. We cannot rule out multiple
and endogenous pathways to reform. Nonetheless,
the analysis rests on reasonable assumptions about
the relationship between the type of political insti-
tutions in a state and the adoption of party finance
laws.
Despite a considerable amount of research on
party finance, the field (unlike the study of electoral
systems) lacks an agreed upon set of concepts,
frameworks, and theories to advance comparative
research. As one scholar put it, ‘‘In spite of the
long fascination with money and politics, for a
long time the study of political finance remained
an under-theorized one, with few scholars making
systematic efforts to find causal relationships or to
make cross-national generalizations’’ (Scarrow
2007).2 With the accumulation of cross-national
data this is changing. Recent comparative research
uses data from western European states to explain
how particular laws emerge (Koss 2008, 2010; Scar-
row 2007). Such studies allow for in-depth and rich
analysis cannot make broader generalizations about
reform in other regions.
With the advent of more comprehensive data on
political party laws across multiple states and re-
gions, scholars have begun to create typologies of fi-
nance systems based on the contours of regulations.
Party finance regimes are highly heterogeneous and
context specific (Casas-Zamora 2005). At the same
time, however, identifying common features across
units of analysis is essential to constructing broad
theoretical claims to advance knowledge. Two stud-
ies in particular have exploited new data to con-
struct dimensions that describe different types of
party finance regimes and to systematically evaluate
the formation of laws. Van Biezen (2010) offered a
conceptual model built on three dimensions: contri-
bution/spending limits, transparency, and subsidiza-
tion. This model, however, has not been subjected to
multivariate empirical testing to evaluate whether
these dimensions are the most effective measure
of party finance regimes or whether particular out-
comes are associated with them. Abel van Es
(2016) offered an index of intervention that com-
bined disclosure requirements, contribution limits,
spending limits, and public financing on a single di-
mension. However, this unidimensional conceptual
framework assessing only the intensity of regulation
makes it hard to differentiate among regulatory re-
gimes and risks collapsing distinctive aspects of
regulation and obscuring the possibility that states
have divergent approaches to regulating money in
politics.
The debate over how to conceive party finance
systems remains unresolved. In this article we
argue that party finance regimes are best captured
along two dimensions: (1) interventions to regulate
income and spending and (2) requirements to dis-
close sources for the purpose of transparency. This
work largely supports previous conceptual work
(van Biezen 2010) by demonstrating empirically a
coherent typology of party finance regimes. It
goes further by contributing to an understanding
of how reform might develop. We challenge prior
work that considers only short-term explanations,
as well as recent models (Abel van Es 2016) that
1We are not implying that the timing of the reform does not
matter to the substance of it. Indeed, reforms may be inextrica-
bly linked to the nature of scandals that precipitate reform, as
well as the contemporary social, economic, or political context
(e.g., rise of labor unions, emergence of the Internet, party com-
petition, etc.). Our goal in this analysis is to illustrate that insti-
tutional antecedents are associated with different approaches to
reform, even as these institutional roots interact with the context
of the political moment.
2Some past efforts constructed explicit comparative frame-
works to distinguish among political finance systems. For ex-
ample, one study distinguishes normatively between funding
regimes that are ‘‘plutocratic’’ or ‘‘grassroots’’ (H. E. Alexander
and Nassmacher 2001) while another employs three categories,
claiming that funds can be from internal sources (e.g., party
dues), external (business firms, unions) and/or state funding
(Von Beyme 1985). None of these frameworks, however,
draws explicitly on formal rules that institutionalize the con-
tours of regulation.
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risk multi-collinearity and endogeneity. We focus
on a limited range of institutional variables that
have both theoretical leverage and that tend to
exist prior to the formation of party finance laws.
While limitations of data preclude strong causal
claims, our findings reveal that the types of political
institutions are associated with how states inter-
vene in party finance when they have incentives to
do so. States with a French legal tradition tend to reg-
ulate the flow of money in politics the most, while
states with proportional representation systems tend
to require considerable disclosure of party finances.
We explicitly chose not to address whether coun-
tries enforce the rules they promulgate since this
inquiry would entail a massive investigation of ad-
ministrative performance that is beyond the scope
of this project. Identifying the content of laws is an
important starting point for understanding the institu-
tional development of party finance regimes, making
it possible to develop further research assessing the
causes and consequences of political regulations
(Scarrow 2007).
CONCEPTUALIZING PARTY FINANCE
REGIMES
To make comparisons across a large sample of
states we focus only on interventions directed to-
ward political parties. Many state regulations only
apply to political parties, while others regulate can-
didates, other political actors (such as interest
groups, corporations, labor unions, and independent
actors), and parties. Party finance may encompass
both funds for election campaigns and ongoing or-
ganizational activities, but does not include broader
categories of regulation on interest groups and lob-
byists. While ‘‘party’’ and ‘‘campaign’’ finance are
conceptually distinctive, they are related. Having
organizational funds in off-election seasons is nec-
essary for recruiting candidates, developing policy
proposals, and developing donor/voter lists. Our de-
cision to measure and study party finance this way
allows us to include as much data as possible
about laws in states while also maximizing the
size of the sample.3
Building on previous research, we advance the
understanding of party finance in two ways. First,
we clarify the dimensionality of finance laws by
constructing a classification scheme based on two
dimensions: (1) government intervention on income
and spending and (2) transparency of finances.
Using these two dimensions we classify four differ-
ent types of party finance regimes internationally
and situate states within each of these regimes. Sec-
ond, we identify associations between the emergence
of particular laws and commonalities between states
using factors that are exogenous to these laws. Pre-
vious work includes various measures of corruption,
democratization, and economic development to ex-
plain laws. These factors appear highly endogenous
to the process. One recent study included a range
of variables (Abel van Es 2016), many of which
appeared highly correlated, raising concerns about
biased estimates. We propose a more parsimonious
approach given that many complex and interacting
factors may be associated with reform. Rather than
including a large number of variables that could be
endogenous or highly correlated, we focused on the
potential impact of political institutions. Given our
reliance on cross-sectional data, our model assesses
institutional variables, which measure characteristics
that typically exist prior to the emergence of party fi-
nance laws. This approach lays the groundwork for
future research that might exploit panel designs (as
data is collected over time) to untangle the effect of
factors that are exogenous to outcome variables.
Classification scheme for party finance regimes
We define ‘‘party finance regime’’ as the config-
uration of national laws and rules that regulate the
finances of parties in a given state. This is the over-
arching concept we unpack and organize through
our typology (see Collier et al. 2012). The Interna-
tional Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assis-
tance (IDEA), which collects the data, organizes
political finance laws into four categories: spending
limits, contribution limits, disclosure requirements,
and public funding. We make the conceptual and
empirical case for thinking about party finance
along two dimensions.4
3The trade-off in our approach is that we cannot say much about
how states regulate candidate and interest group financing in
states where such groups are highly active.
4Abel van Es (2016) conceptualizes the degree of state interven-
tion based on a single dimension, ranging from laissez-faire re-
gimes to regimes with state interventions in virtually all aspects
of campaign finance. As van Biezen (2010) conceptualized, im-
portant distinctions between the types of interventions and reg-
ulations emerge between states that reflect aspects of political
culture, as well as institutional and economic arrangements.
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The first dimension reflects the degree in regulat-
ing party income. We view government efforts to re-
strict the flow of money into electoral politics as a
financial intervention in the marketplace of political
funds. The assumptions underlying restrictions on
party funding sources are to level the playing field
for competing political parties and to relieve them
from their dependence upon a narrow band of pri-
vate sources. This dependence is often viewed as
having a corruptive influence upon policymakers,
or at least unequal influence on the political process
(Lessig 2011; van Biezen 2010). The intent of both
limits and subsidies is to alter and diffuse the sources
of political money (Stratmann and Aparicio-Castillo
2006; Masket and Miller 2015; Albert 2018). Many
governments place constraints on party financing
from a variety of funding sources: bans are often
enacted on foreign, corporate, union, and anonymous
donors. Many states also limit the amount of dona-
tions that parties receive both inside and outside elec-
tion periods.
Another way to regulate income is to provide var-
ious forms of public subsidies to different political
actors. These subsidies include free access to
broad media, cash subventions, as well as indirect
subsidies, including tax relief for parties and donors,
provision of physical space for party functions, sub-
sidized postage, and transportation. Finally, states
may choose to limit party spending as a means of
equalizing resources and taming the demand for
money. Limiting spending is another way to limit
income because it imposes ceilings on how much
money a party will have (Scarrow 2004). At one
end of the spectrum are governments that impose
many limits on contributions on a variety of sources
and caps on spending. At the other end of the spec-
trum are governments that do none of this. Be it con-
tribution limits, subsidies, or spending caps, the
intent of these laws is to limit money to parties as
a way of addressing a variety of ethical concerns
about the political system, which might include pre-
venting corruption and promoting equality and fair-
ness. We label all of these interventions as attempts
to regulate party income.
The second dimension of party finance regimes
concerns transparency. Governments vary consid-
erably in the extent to which they make information
available to the public about the sources and uses of
political funds. A finance system is ‘‘open’’ if the
public can easily observe who donates money and
how it is spent. A system is completely ‘‘closed’’
if none of this information is made available to
the public. Governments differ on requirements
for who must disclose finances and what transac-
tions they must disclose. Disclosure requirements
are meaningless unless there is an enforcement
mechanism and technology to make information ac-
cessible, comprehensible, and timely, so people and
civil society organizations can act on the informa-
tion. Given that implementation is difficult to mea-
sure, we took the existence of regulations requiring
some level of transparency as a statement that gov-
ernments view disclosure as relevant to controlling
the perception of political corruption. We antici-
pated that governments signal to citizens that they
are dedicated to fighting corruption by creating
laws, even if they fail to implement or enforce
them adequately.5
Our arguments for a two-by-two typology, rather
than other configurations, are conceptual, empirical,
and practical. Conceptually, we view two different
actions the state can take in regulating party
funds. First, it can focus on the democratic values
of transparency and accountability by requiring dis-
closure of finances. Second, it can encourage dem-
ocratic values of fairness and equality by trying to
manage how much money is available for financing
politics. Note that both dimensions contribute to
anti-corruption concerns. From an empirical per-
spective, we chose to combine contribution limits,
spending limits, and subsidies into one dimension
for regulating income, rather than create a third di-
mension for subsidies, as some others have done.
Prior research supports our decision, demonstrating
how contribution limits (Stratmann and Aparicio-
Castillo 2006), spending limits (Scarrow 2004),
and subsidies (Masket and Miller 2015; Albert
2017) all affect the amount of income available to
candidates and parties. Finally, from a practical per-
spective, we sought to develop a parsimonious
model that broadly reflects complex processes and
messy data, without ignoring the essential differ-
ences. In future research, a two-by-two matrix can
5In theory, we might have included a third dimension called
quality of enforcement (strong-weak), but the data are monu-
mentally difficult to gather for such a large sample. But more
importantly, we do not think ‘‘enforcement’’ reflects a concep-
tual subcategory of party finance regimes. Rather, it likely re-
flects a measure of concepts outside the scope of our focus,
such as administrative power and the effectiveness of state con-
trol over matters in civil society.
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be applied more easily than typologies with more
categories as independent or dependent variables.
Combining the income and transparency dimen-
sions along an X- and Y-axis created four types of
‘‘party finance regimes,’’ which is the overarching
concept in our analysis (as displayed in the title of
Figure 1). The concept is disaggregated into row
and column variables to capture the most salient el-
ements of variation in the concept (see Collier et al.
2012). As shown in Figure 1, we refer to these re-
gimes as: (I) market-based, (II) public utility, (III)
state-coopted, and (IV) unregulated. When we mea-
sured the regulations of each state along each of the
dimensions (as explained in the methods section) we
were able to situate the states within one of these
four party finance regimes. We made the variables
continuous based on the assumption that additional
legal requirements (on income or transparency) have
increasing impact on party behavior. This is, in fact,
the stated justification by reformers for expanding
the scope of these policies.
(I) Market-based. In a market-based regime the
interventions into party finance are relatively lim-
ited. States with this regime type tend to place
fewer restrictions on the size and source of contribu-
tions, if any, than those with a public utility regime.
Importantly, however, the state has a regulatory
agency in place to monitor transactions and enforce
penalties. All markets are created and maintained
by government, simply by acknowledging property
rights or charters of existence, e.g., corporations,
political parties, etc. (Polanyi 1944). What makes
markets more or less ‘‘private’’ is the degree of con-
trol the state imposes on the choices made by the
regulated entity. In the scope of party finance re-
gimes, the state is less likely to constrain how polit-
ical parties seek their funding or spend their
resources. However, the essential regulatory feature
is compelled disclosure of financial records. An un-
derlying assumption is that transparency of transac-
tions will enable the electorate to hold politicians
accountable for how they raise and spend money,
presumably by punishing political parties in elec-
tions when they violate norms of financing politics,
such as taking large sums from corporations or
wealthy donors. In this regime, parties tend to be
viewed primarily as private associations with the
legitimacy to manage their affairs internally. Market-
based regimes include some states where policy-
makers choose to provide direct subsidies to parties.
However, in these instances, the parties are treated
as private associations and thus afforded a wide
berth to operate in an environment free of most
other income interventions. The market regime ap-
pears especially representative of liberal values that
focus on free speech rights for individuals or groups,
while simultaneously putting faith in the capacity of
enforcement agencies and the electoral system to tem-
per regulatory violations (however few rules exist)
and perceived improprieties of party finance.
(II) Public utility. A public utility regime is char-
acterized by heavy regulation of party income.
Generally, public financing is made available and
private contributions are restricted in size and source.
FIG. 1. Party finance regimes.
TYPOLOGIES OF PARTY FINANCE SYSTEMS 5
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Additionally, the state may impose limits on political
spending. These regimes also tend to require a high
degree of transparency for political funds, though
the quality of information may vary greatly. The
key point is that the state endorses extensive forms
of public control over party finances, with an un-
derlying assumption that the party is providing a
public good that must be monitored. Since parties
have considerable power and consequence in the
political system, the state needs to constrain party
organizations to prevent rent-seeking and private-
regarding behavior. Epstein (1986) applied the
term, public utility, more broadly to explain how
the state regulates political parties in a range of
areas, including party nominations and organiza-
tional structure. Parties as public utilities are viewed
as quasi-governmental agencies rather than private
associations. While the term is not a perfect fit, be-
cause parties do not necessarily have monopolistic
power (although some party systems may appear
as duopolies or cartels), the claim is that the public
has a compelling interest to justify state control
over private associations. Since the state has a le-
gitimate interest in avoiding corrupt politics and
maintaining the equality of the vote, it has legiti-
mate authority to regulate party financial activity.
(III) State-coopted. Countries with state-coopted
regimes intervene in the financing of parties in avariety
of ways, yet do not provide public information about
party and candidate financing. The key distinction is
that the state appearswilling to constrict income to par-
ties, butwithout any transparency about financial trans-
actions. Partiesmight be subsidized by state funds and/
or allowed increments of private sources of financing.
The electorate, however, has little capacity to evaluate
the sources and uses of political resources. This dy-
namic tends to make the political parties dependent
on the goodwill of the state for its finances and enforce-
ment (or lack thereof). The state can withhold funds or
dole themout basedon factors thatmaynotbe transpar-
ent to the wider public. At the same time, state regula-
tors can ignore or enforce breaches of the rules when
political parties seek illicit financing. Regardless,
these regimes tend to put parties at the mercy of the
state. Additionally, lacking transparency while impos-
ing party income regulations creates a high risk that in-
cumbent politicians might rely on state resources to
promote themselves—using not only funds dedicated
to campaigns, but governmental resources such as
mail services, government-controlled broadcasting
systems, or patronage. This type of regime reflects a
systemwithhighdeference to, or insulationof, political
elites, often creating a situation that could be called a
political cartel or oligarchy. The subsequent analysis
reveals that only a handful of states in our sample—
and no liberal democracies—fall into this category.
(IV) Unregulated. In an unregulated regime,
there are few state interventions in party finance
and few transparency requirements. At the extreme,
politicians can receive political contributions in any
size and from any source. In addition, the public has
no way to learn about such transactions. Given that
there is limited information provided about the way
that politics is financed, it cannot be considered a
transparent market since voters have minimal ca-
pacity to view information that might enable them
to make informed decisions and to hold politicians
accountable for potential corruption or excessive in-
fluence of donors. In this context, political parties
are understood as purely private entities in which
the state has few legitimate claims for intervening
in organizational affairs. It is a regime in which
the state must assume that parties have internal ac-
countability mechanisms to stifle corrupt behavior
but, unlike market-based regimes, the state has
few ways of auditing party affairs should parties vi-
olate public norms. In new democracies, the ab-
sence of regulations might reflect the state’s weak
institutional capacity or legitimacy to intervene in
party affairs. In this sense, this kind of regime re-
flects the ‘‘Wild West’’ of party finance with limited
or nonexistent state oversight.
With this conceptual framework in place, we turn
to the underlying institutional factors associated
with states’ placement along each of the two dimen-
sions, and within party finance regimes.
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND PARTY
FINANCE REGIMES
We draw on comparative analysis to understand
party finance reforms based on three institutional fac-
tors: (1) legal systems, (2) governmental systems,
and (3) electoral systems. The analysis assesses the
degree to which these factors covary with the two di-
mensions that defined regime types: income and
transparency. While we cannot claim to generate a
causal theory of party finance reform, we can begin
to illustrate patterns of association between political
6 WILTSE ET AL.
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institutions and approaches to regulating party fi-
nance. These patterns might be evaluated in subse-
quent research using time-series, panel data as it
becomes available.
Political theories emphasize that institutions are
created to allocate resources based on who has
power. Rather than efficiency, the goal is to build in-
stitutions that allow those in power to retain their
positions and allocate resources based on either
their own preferences or the interests and values
of their supporters (March and Olsen 1995). Politi-
cal theories typically emphasize the importance of
‘‘founding moments,’’ meaning points in time
where power is assigned to particular groups with
lasting effects (Clift and Fisher 2004; March and
Olsen 1995; Panebianco 1988). Founding institu-
tional moments shape present and future prefer-
ences related to power, ideas, and values, and
founding institutions such as constitutions or legal
systems set the table for future developments. Pre-
vious work has focused on institutional change in
political finance by expounding on three theories
about self-interested motives, evolutionary shifts
in the environment, and the need for legitimacy
(Clift and Fisher 2004). We similarly argue that
founding moments might have important down-
stream effects on political reforms. We should be
able to observe different reform trajectories associ-
ated with unique political institutions. Importantly,
given our reliance on cross-sectional data, we
choose to focus analytically on relatively stable fea-
tures of political systems that may affect, in a path
dependent manner, the development of party fi-
nance regimes. In contrast, prior work using similar
cross-sectional data (Abel van Es 2016) has in-
cluded economic factors and democratic indicators
(perceptions of corruption, democracy scores, etc.),
which often are in place prior to the implementa-
tion of reform.
Historical legal system
We applied understandings about foundational
political institutions to the development of party fi-
nance laws, starting with constitutional systems and
legal systems (David and Brierley 1978; La Porta
et al. 1999). We anticipated that states with a conti-
nental ‘‘statist’’ constitutional tradition, such as
France, would be more likely to use state power to
regulate political activity, including party finance
when faced with a corruption scandal or any other
trigger of campaign finance reform. Clift and Fisher
(2004), for example, show that scandal ‘‘evoked a
response from the powerful etatiste dimension of
the French republican tradition,’’ (690) with com-
prehensive state financial interventions. In contrast,
states with an Anglo constitutional tradition would
be more likely to have classically liberal party fi-
nance laws that are rooted in traditions of private
property rights and individual rights (Ertman
1997; Finer 1997). Therefore, the state would be
less likely to intervene in regulating private contri-
butions to political organizations. In sum, states
that have adopted the Napoleonic code law tradition
are more likely to regulate party income, which
includes limits on contributions/spending and pub-
lic subsidies, than those under a common law or hy-
brid legal tradition (Abel van Es 2016, 216). On the
second dimension of transparency, we did not ex-
pect any differences between continental statist
and Anglo traditions with respect to disclosure
rules. Both traditions plausibly view an important
role for the state in financial disclosure—the
Anglo tradition because it relies on individuals to
make rationally informed decisions based on infor-
mation about party activities, while the continental
statist tradition might view disclosure as a mecha-
nism that permits the state to monitor organizations,
which provide a public good.
Presidential governing system
There are countervailing theories to explain the
relationship between presidentialism and party fi-
nance restrictions. On the one hand, studies that
show presidential systems have multiple veto
points, which would make it harder to pass reforms
that might upend the status quo for important inter-
ests (Binder 1999; Moe and Caldwell 1994; Tsebe-
lis 1995). Related, presidential systems, with
separation of powers, may thwart the effort of cartel
parties to exploit state resources, such as party sub-
sidies, for their own benefit (Abel van Es 2016).
Separation of powers also tends to produce weaker
parties (Mainwaring 1991), which gives rise to
candidate-centered campaigns requiring more
money and thereby weakens incentives for restric-
tions. Finally, it could be argued that presidents
who rely on corrupt spoils of office may not desire
party finance reform.
On the other hand, several theories suggest that
presidential systems would be more likely to have
TYPOLOGIES OF PARTY FINANCE SYSTEMS 7
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party finance restrictions than parliamentary re-
gimes. First, perceptions of public corruption are
greater under presidential systems (Gerring and
Thacker 2004), which would heighten public de-
mand for anti-corruption reforms. Second, presi-
dents, as directly elected executives by a national
constituency (Cheibub et al. 2014), would be espe-
cially attuned to majoritarian demands for popular
political reforms given this vertical accountability
compared to the legislature (O’Donnell 1998).
Third, presidents have relatively less to fear elector-
ally than members of legislative parties from passing
such reforms. Compared to legislative incumbents,
presidents can rely more on state resources from
the executive branch to reward potential supporters
(Berry et al. 2010; Figueiredo and Limongi 2000;
Hudak 2013; Kriner and Reeves 2012) and publicize
themselves in anticipation of reelection due to the sa-
lience and status of the office (Charnock et al 2009;
Doherty 2012). In this way, political spending by
presidential incumbents likely matters less per vote,
and they may be more amenable to restrictions on
party contributions and spending. Indeed, such re-
strictions may give them advantages by suppressing
the capacity of lesser-known rivals to campaign
robustly.
These competing theories and findings make ex-
planations about the relationship between presiden-
tial systems and party finance laws difficult. On
balance, we expect that states with presidential sys-
tems are more likely to have restrictions on party
income than states with parliamentary or semi-
presidential systems, largely because presidential
incumbents appear less reliant on party finances to
win reelection. However, given strong arguments
in the other direction, we would not be surprised to
observe parliamentary systems intervening more,
or no difference at all. Certainly, for the transpar-
ency dimension, we have no expectations in either
direction about whether we will observe more rules
requiring transparency.
Proportional representation electoral system
Proportional representation (PR) systems tend to
introduce more political parties to the political sys-
tem. This dynamic can create pressure for more eq-
uitable distribution of resources and publicity, as
well as a consensus for the inclusion of public fund-
ing (Koss 2010). Research shows that PR systems
tend to support greater redistributive social welfare
policies (Austen-Smith 2000; Crepaz 1998; Iverson
and Soskice 2006). The same logic can be applied to
political finance (Pinto-Duschinsky 2002). We ex-
pect pressure, particularly from smaller parties, for
a fair distribution of resources, which would mean
greater restrictions on major parties and/or public
subsidies for minor parties so they compete with
larger parties. An alternative theory of cartel parties
is that the major parties might use the party finance
system to stifle the ability of other parties to com-
pete effectively (Katz and Mair 1995, 2009; though
see Scarrow 2006). In other words, political parties
may attempt to contain the success of political chal-
lengers through self-serving subsidies and onerous re-
strictions on private financing of rivals. The outcome
may depend on allocation mechanisms, which cannot
be determined based on the data available. We cannot
adjudicate whether pressure for subsidies and restric-
tions in PR systems is based on norms of equality
and fairness, or whether it reflects the desire of dom-
inant parties to design a system in their favor even if it
appears fair on paper. Regardless, we expect that PR
systems are more likely to have income interventions
in the party finance system (Koss 2010).
We also believe that PR systems are more likely
to put pressure on the state for disclosure of party
finance. PR systems tend to produce multiple par-
ties, which have a common incentive to hold rival
parties accountable. In multi-party systems, how-
ever, there is a collective action problem in pursuing
mutual accountability. It is costly for a party to ex-
pend its resources to investigate other parties. The
hope is that another party will do the investigative
work, which leads to the free rider problem. Having
a disclosure system in place lowers the cost of inves-
tigation for all parties. Even if cartel parties have
gamed the regulatory system to control resources,
they have little to fear from agreeing to disclosure
of financing if they follow rules that tend favor
them. In sum, we expect that states that use some
type of proportional representation system to elect
legislators are more likely to enact laws requiring
disclose of political money than states that use a ma-
joritarian system.
Regime stability
Finally, we include one non-institutional control
variable that we believe affects the adoption of
rules. States that have enjoyed longer lived constitu-
tional orders are more likely to have developed
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strong norms of behavior that often substitute for
formal rules (Clift and Fisher 2004). Through insti-
tutionalization, they have created a degree of ‘‘so-
cial capital’’ making the formal adoption of
campaign finance laws less necessary. Newer re-
gimes, that have had fewer years of stable gover-
nance by less established and institutionalized
parties, may lead policy makers to seek ways to sta-
bilize the party system As Karvonen (2007) posits,
new democratic regimes ‘‘use the law to counteract
lingering anti-democratic tendencies,’’ largely to
avoid consolidation of power by actors of the former
regime (450). One such option is by financially sup-
porting parties and ensuring greater transparency.
Moreover, as van Biezen has argued (2004, 2010),
newer democracies are often established in a context
where international norms or ‘‘best practices’’ in the
financing of parties are seen as key instruments to
provide equity among the new parties. States with
longer lived constitutional orders will be less likely
to adopt party finance interventions of any kind
than states with shorter constitutional orders.
DATA AND METHODS
Data
We surveyed and analyzed party finance laws and
factors potentially associated with them across
countries using an observational cross-sectional de-
sign. Our data were drawn from multiple sources,
specifically:
 Party finance law data collected by the Interna-
tional Institute for Democracy and Electoral
Assistance (IDEA) (Falguera et al. 2014;
Ohman 2012).
 Data on government characteristics archived
by the ACE Project, Polity IV (Marshall and
Gurr 2014), the U.S. Central Intelligence
Agency, the Quality of Government Dataset
(QoG) (Teorell et al. 2016).
 Data on executive formation is sourced from
Elgie (2014).
Our measures of regulation variables were (1) in-
come intervention in party finance and (2) transpar-
ency regarding money in politics. IDEA provided
detailed information regarding laws in these areas
(Falguera et al. 2014; Ohman 2012). IDEA defined
its population with the inclusion criterion of coun-
tries that were United Nations (UN) member states,
and exclusion criteria of (a) countries that ban polit-
ical parties, (b) countries where parties are not
allowed to register candidates, and (c) countries
that had not held elections in 30 years (Ohman
2012). Its dataset contained 180 countries and had
90% coverage of all measured variables.
We created additive indexes that identified the
two dimensions we used to classify party finance re-
gimes: the regulation of party income and transpar-
ency. IDEA specifically included measures of the
existence or absence of certain restrictions, such
as bans on donations to political parties by corpora-
tions or unions, as well as providing detailed quali-
tative descriptive data on measures such as the
maximum contribution limit that applied to each
type of contributor (assuming that a country had
established contribution limits). Given the complex-
ity of these laws, their efforts to summarize these
details were incomplete. As a result, we relied on
bright-line measures such as the existence or ab-
sence of certain types of laws in our analysis. The
‘‘income intervention’’ variable was constructed
by equally weighing count variables of three types
of interventions: (1) limits on funding to parties,
(2) state subsidies to parties, and (3) limits on
party spending. The variable ranges from 0 to 1.
Each component is presented in Table 1, along with
the percentage of states that employ a particular reg-
ulation. The ‘‘transparency’’ variable was similarly
constructed. A count of different transparency regula-
tions was aggregated, and the variable was scaled
from 0 to 1. Each of the components is presented in
Table 2, and a full description of both variables
(with examples) is found in Appendix A.
The choice to rely on additive indices reflected
the baseline assumption that the items within each
category had equal analytical weight; we had no
theoretical or empirical justification to adjust the
weights unequally.6 For example, with the transpar-
ency scale, requirements of making donor names
public and full disclosure of finances were assumed
6We can think of no strong theoretical arguments or empirical
evidence to overweight particular rules on party finance rules;
nor can we think of theoretical argument to weight subcatego-
ries (contribution limits, spending limits, subsidies) differently
in our overall measure for income regulations. In the absence of
strong theory or empirical research, we believe counting regu-
lations into an index requires the fewest assumptions and is in-
tuitively appealing.
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to be equally politically relevant. The application of
summary scores is most appropriate (relative to fac-
tor analysis) in cases where measures are untested
and exploratory of the concept, and when seeking
to preserve variation in the original data; both
these circumstances applied for these data, which
apply previously untested scales to understand an
understudied area (DiStefano et al. 2009; Hair
et al. 2006; Tabachnick and Fidell 2001).
Additionally, as others have pointed out (Abel van
Es 2016), many states combine multiple, seemingly
contradictory array of rules (e.g., they have spending
limits without contribution limits). Rather than try to
make sense of these various configurations or try to
treat each type of regulation separately, we choose
to view these regulations as ‘‘more or less’’ interven-
tions into regulating party income. Our approach to
measuring the two dimensions using additive indices,
with implied intervals, rather than nominal or ordinal
categories means that it is entirely possible for states
with very different mixes of laws to be placed in the
same regime. For example, a state that has a high
score on ‘‘limits on contributions,’’ but low score on
‘‘limits on spending,’’ could be placed in the same re-
gime as one that has the opposite configuration.
Underlying institutional types fell into three cat-
egories: (a) legal system, coded as 1 for states that
follow the French code law tradition, otherwise 0;
(b) presidential system, coded as 1 for states that
vested executive authority in an elected president
(semi-presidential regimes inclusive) as opposed
to parliamentary systems coded as 0; (c) electoral
system, coded as 1 for an electoral system that
used some kind of proportional representation sys-
tems for choosing legislators, otherwise 0.
As a control, we included a variable recording the
number of years since regime change (an integer).
A list of the variables included, distinguished by
type and source, is provided in Table 3.
Methods
We first organized countries by their scores on
income intervention and transparency. We placed
cut-points on each of the dimensions at their means
to separate countries on each axis. We used mean
cut-points rather than an absolute standard because
we had no theoretical or empirical justification for
placing the axis at any particular point. Thus, the ty-
pology is necessarily a relative comparison across
nations. However, we highlight polar types that
most clearly reflect conceptual typology by high-
lighting the states in the top corners of the two-
dimensional space (Collier et. al 2012). Those that
do not fall within these areas are considered more
intermediate types within the regime category.
Each state’s classification is presented in Appendix
Table B1. This allowed us to characterize the na-
ture of each country’s party finance regime into
one of our four types. We then identified laws
about income intervention and transparency. Our
analysis relied on ordinary least squares (OLS) re-
gression to separately model income intervention
and transparency, and multinomial logistic regres-
sion to identify associations with party finance re-
gime type. The analysis was completed using Stata
(Long and Freese 2014).
RESULTS
Data were collected between 2012 and 2015;
depending on the analysis, we were able to include
between 118 and 126 countries. Variation in case
numbers is due to case-wise deletion of missing
data. Based on using the mean score as a cut-point
we identified 64 states in the category of public
Table 2. Transparency Requirements
Type of requirement Percent
Reports of general finances 73.3
Reports of campaign finances 54.9
Reports of finances publicly available 62.8
Names of donors always public 42.6
Enforcement of finance laws by public agency 75.8
Other public agencies share in oversight 49.7
Percentages are of all states found in the IDEA dataset.
Table 1. Income Interventions in Campaign Finance
Type of intervention Percent
Ban on foreign donations 67.5
Ban on corporate donations 24.7
Ban on corporate donations from government
contractors
49.4
Ban union donations 26.3
Ban anonymous donations 54.9
Limit on donations outside of election period 32.2
Limit on donations during election period 38.9
Public financing—regularly 55.4
Public financing—for election 31.6
Free or subsidized media 69.6
Indirect public funding 67.7
Limits on spending 29
Percentages are of all states found in the IDEA dataset.
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utility, 34 as market-based, 39 as unregulated, and
only 5 as state-coopted. Figure 2 shows the relative
position of each state on the two dimensions and
their classification under our scheme (marked with
the appropriate International Organization for
Standardization [ISO] abbreviation, with darker
markers indicating polar types). A slim majority
of states fall into the public utility regime; almost
half of them could be described as ‘‘polar types’’ fit-
ting into the upper right corner of the matrix. In con-
trast, the lack of data in the upper left corner
suggests that market-based regimes appear to lack
‘‘pure’’ forms of the regime type. Nigeria (NG)
and Kazakhstan (KZ) appear to be states closest to
the polar type, regulating income very little, while
requiring a high amount of transparency. The
other states in the quadrant choose to lightly or
moderately regulate income. States in the unregu-
lated regime tend to be developing democracies, ex-
cept for states like Denmark (DK) and Switzerland
Table 3. Variable Definitions and Sources
Variable group Variables Source
Dependent variables
Income interventions (1) Funding limits: bans for foreign, corporate, union, contractor, state, and anonymous
donations and limits on amount of contribution; (2) Public funding: regular and electoral
funding of parties, media subsidies, and other subsidies; (3) Spending limits: political
party expenditure limits
IDEA
Transparency Party financial reporting; reports of parties and candidates are available to the public;
donor names are public; outside institutional oversight
IDEA
Independent variables
Political institutions
Electoral system Proportional representation in the legislature ACE Project
Legal traditions Common law; civil law US CIA
Regime age The number of years since the most recent regime change. Polity IV
Presidential system Presidential and semi-presidential; parliamentary Elgie 2014
FIG. 2. Party finance regimes. Note: Darkened ISO (International Organization for Standardization) abbreviations are polar type
cases.
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(CH). In the lower left quadrant, the polar types
were Dominica (DM), Iraq (IQ), Marshall Islands
(MH), Nauru (NR), and Swaziland (SZ). Finally,
we had very few states in the state-coopted regime,
which suggests that few states choose to regulate in-
come without also requiring transparency. Guate-
mala (GT) is the outlier in choosing to have many
restrictive laws on income but with less than aver-
age transparency. Similarly, the Philippines (PH)
and Jordan (JO) have lax requirements on transpar-
ency even as the laws attempt to restrain party in-
come. The spread of data in the 2 x 2 matrix
suggests that having restrictive income rules is asso-
ciated with greater transparency.
Assessing the dimensions of the classification
scheme
We evaluated the extent to which our two-
dimensional categorization scheme, based on the
level of income regulation (Dimension One) and the
level of transparency (DimensionTwo),was associated
with regime categories. Given that these dimensions
are scaled to produce interval level measurements,
our estimation relied on OLS multivariate regression.
Table 4 contains two columns listing variables along
these two dimensions and two columns listing the an-
ticipated directions of association.
The regressions show association with the level
of income intervention, including measures of sub-
sidies, donation limits, and spending caps. Overall,
approximately 15 percent of the variation could be
accounted for by the variables we include in the
model. This share of variation was limited by both
the small number of cases (n = 126) and a range of
country-specific influences that were not included
in this analysis (including short-term factors such
as political scandals) that could influence the prob-
ability of a nation choosing to enact specific party
finance reforms. The measure most closely associ-
ated with the level of government regulation was a
statist tradition. As expected, states that utilize the
Napoleonic code were more likely to intervene
than common law or hybridized legal systems. On
the other hand, presidential systems, proportional
representations, and regime durability were not as-
sociated with income intervention.
Turning tomeasures associatedwith the enactment
of transparency requirements, we find that nations
that employ proportional representation were more
likely to have adopted stronger transparency laws
when the other factors were held constant. Nations
that use code law tended towards transparency as
well, although this finding failed to reach standard
thresholds of statistical significance, in both one and
two-tailed tests. Neither presidential systems nor lon-
ger lived constitutional orders showed any relation-
ship to transparency laws. These findings show that
different institutional factors are associated with ei-
ther interventions or transparency, which suggests
that we are observing different dimensions of party fi-
nance systems.
Understanding the factors underlying party
finance regimes
We used a multinomial logistic regression to
identify the associations between various regime
classifications using the same institutional variables
(see Table 5). The unregulated regime serves as the
reference category as it represents policy inaction
on both dimensions. The results largely echo the
modelling of the dimensions separately. We find a
strong association between code law states and the
Table 4. OLS Regressions of Income Intervention and Transparency
Income b/se Predicted Transparency b/se Predicted
Code law 0.181*** + 0.080 +
(0.049) (0.051)
Presidential system -0.070 + -0.039 ?
(0.052) (0.053)
Years since regime change -0.000 - 0.000 ?
(0.001) (0.001)
Proportional representation 0.057 + 0.116* +
(0.052) (0.054)
Constant 0.421*** 0.593***
(0.065) (0.064)
Number of cases 128 126
R-square 0.171 0.106
*pjtj < .10 two-tailed; ***pjtj < .01 two-tailed, entries are coefficients with standard errors in parenthesis.
12 WILTSE ET AL.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 U
cs
f L
ib
ra
ry
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
al
ifo
rn
ia
 S
an
 F
ra
nc
isc
o 
fro
m
 w
w
w
.li
eb
er
tp
ub
.c
om
 a
t 0
5/
03
/1
9.
 F
or
 p
er
so
na
l u
se
 o
nl
y.
 
public utility category relative to unregulated states.
Proportional representation was associated with
market-based policies (and their emphasis on dis-
closure) relative to states with unregulated regimes.
These results mirror the results of the regressions
modelling the dimension separately, suggesting ro-
bustness to these institutional factors.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Our study relied on an extensive international
dataset, combining information from a range of
sources, to provide new insights into the ways that
countries regulate political finance. We developed
a conceptual framework to categorize party finance
regimes and evaluate the historical institutional
bases for the design of these regimes. Our results
suggest that there are consistent, stable factors asso-
ciated with adoption of particular sets of laws and
regimes. Previous qualitative research, with a few
recent exceptions, has largely focused on short-
term factors, especially political scandals and re-
lated issues of legitimacy, or changes in the political
environment. Such findings provide important nu-
ance about proximate events that lead to institu-
tional change, but they are difficult to replicate in
a large-N study. More importantly, they do not
allow us to generalize about the kinds of reforms
adopted across states. Some exceptions include
Scarrow (2007; 2011) and Koss (2010) who illus-
trate political and economic circumstances that
make certain kinds of reform more likely when
scandal emerges. Our study focuses primarily on
longer-term institutional features of states that
may lead to certain kinds of finance regimes. Our
results suggest a complementary narrative that
helps explain why governments, in the face of scan-
dals that trigger campaign finance reforms or pres-
sure from international aid organizations, choose
specific kinds of rules rooted in underlying struc-
tural features. Although our findings do not explain
all of the variance inherent in party finance laws, we
identify key associations between party finance sys-
tems and underlying institutional characteristics.
At the outset, we identified two fundamental di-
mensions of a party financing system: (1) regulatory
interventions that affect income (via contribution and
spending limits, and subsidies) and (2) the breadth of
transparency laws. These two dimensions generated
four distinctive types of party finance regimes:
market-based, public utilities, state-coopted, and un-
regulated regimes. A majority of states fell into the
public utility regime with its combination of heavy
restrictions on income and lots of transparency.
While many states were market-based regimes, few
of them were polar ‘‘pure’’ types since most imposed
at least a few constraints on income. The second larg-
est number of states fell into the unregulated regime;
most are considered developing rather than advanced
democracies. The state-coopted regime with its
heavy restrictions on income and little transparency
did not include many states. Overall, the pattern of
regulations suggest that strong regulations on income
tend to covary with disclosure requirements (the cor-
relation is .65). Not without reason, it appears that
once a state begins to regulate on one dimension, it
starts to regulate on the other.
We then identified institutional features associ-
ated with whether states embraced aspects of either
Table 5. Multinomial Logistic Regression of Regime Type
Market based Public utility State coopted
b/se Predicted b/se Predicted b/se Predicted
Code law -0.133 + 0.983* + .320 +
(0.611) (0.540) (1.163)
Presidential system 0.286 ? -0.435 + 0.326 +
(0.662) (0.569) (1.355)
Years since regime change 0.005 ? 0.002 - -0.007 -
(0.008) (0.008) (0.025)
Proportional representation 1.438** + 0.812 + 1.293 ?
(0.627) (0.541) (1.297)
Constant -1.105 0.018 -2.911
(0.800) (0.663) (1.720)
Number of cases 119
Pseudo R-square 0.069
*p jtj < .10 two-tailed; **p jtj < .05 two-tailed, entries are coefficients with standard errors in parenthesis.
Multinomial logistic regression, unregulated regime as reference category.
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dimension of reform, which would place them into
one of these four regimes. Most importantly, we
found that income interventions appear strongly
linked with systems that embrace a more active
and strong state, as embodied in French-style code
law. It should not be surprising that such states pur-
sue interventionist policies in party finance in ways
they do in other policy domains. These states tend to
fall into public utility regimes because they heavily
regulate the sources and uses of party financing,
while also requiring some transparency.
We did not identify an association between presi-
dential systems and income interventions. We
expected that the nature of electoral resources and in-
centives of incumbent presidents would imply that
presidential systems were linked with denser regula-
tions on party finance. To the degree that presidents
exploit the resources of the state in illegitimate
ways for reelection, it suggests they have little incen-
tive to push for reforms with any more frequency
than parliamentary legislatures. The absence of any
association suggests that more research is needed to
compare party finance systems in presidential and
parliamentary systems. Comparing these systems,
we would want to know more about how money is
raised, the relative importance of political parties in
financing politics, media coverage of politics, and
which kind of candidates benefit the most from addi-
tional spending. Any of these variables may tell us
the relative importance of money in the political sys-
tem for different actors and incentives for reform.
Regarding the effect of proportional representa-
tion, we expected that such states would have robust
income interventions and stronger transparency re-
quirements. We found that PR systems were associ-
ated with greater transparency but not greater
interventions in regulating the flow of money. We
posited that PR systems could provide stronger in-
centives for states to adopt better transparency
rules to address the collective action problem of
holding multiple parties accountable for their fi-
nances. Regarding income interventions, previous
work has tried to assess whether political parties
in PR systems regulate money to equalize the play-
ing field or to create cartels. We cannot adjudicate
these opposing dynamics in this analysis, and the
fact that either pathway seems plausible, depending
on the context, suggests the need for more analysis
on patterns of reform under PR and non-PR sys-
tems. Additional research should focus compara-
tively on the choices made by PR systems by
testing factors we did not include here, such as the
number of political parties, or relative size of differ-
ent parties in the legislature at the time of passing
reforms. This kind of study may illustrate whether
mainstream parties under PR systems confer advan-
tages on themselves by promulgating particular sets
of finance rules (Katz and Mair 1995).
We found that most states were classified as public
utility regimes, which was associated with having a
statist tradition. In contrast, states that were regulated
markets tended to have PR systems and emphasize
promotion of transparency rather than income inter-
ventions. We were not able to distinguish between
states classified as unregulated and state-coopted re-
gimes except to note that a handful of advanced de-
mocracies, including Denmark and Switzerland,
appeared to be unregulated systems in which neither
one restricts funds significantly or makes transac-
tions readily transparent (see Appendix Table B1).
This study deepens the puzzle for those who study
political finance in the U.S. context. Based on our
findings, it seems unlikely that the U.S. would have
a comprehensive system of interventions or even a
presidential public financing system. A reading of
U.S. political finance law indicates there are many
rules on the books, even if it appears to be the ‘‘Wild
West’’ of political finance. We suggest that a chal-
lenge to passing robust political reforms in the U.S.
is that the institutional context is not fertile for intense
interventions given that the U.S. lacks a continental
statist tradition. Progressive-inspired reforms have
been weakened consistently as they pass through the
constitutional lens of the courts. Based on institutional
theories we would expect the U.S. to be situated as a
market-based or unregulated regime; however, our
measures classify it as a public utility regime. This
is likely due to a Progressive ‘‘statist’’ tradition,
which some have likened to a second founding (Mil-
kis andMileur 1999;Milkis 2009). This second tradi-
tion will inevitably rub against an older Madisonian
tradition of limited government intervention, and we
speculate that this dual tradition explains the Jekyll
and Hyde dynamic of U.S. reforms.
The institutional relationships appear to apply
reasonably well to several advanced democracies.
France, for example, is a classic statist nation that
has created a thickly regulated system of political fi-
nance since its reforms in 1988. It is clearly a public
utility regime. Although the French state was a late-
comer to political reform, particularly compared to
the United States and the United Kingdom (Clift
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and Fisher 2004), our analysis is not about the tim-
ing of reforms so much as the regime approach,
given that reforms have passed. Australia’s path of
reforms is typical of market-based regimes. It
went through two major rounds in 1918 and 1983,
and in both instances it stopped well short of the
major interventions into party income that we see
in public utility regimes. Though its current regime
allows for a degree of state funding (similar to a
few other market regimes) and limits the amount of
anonymous donations, these are comparatively
light. TheAustralians rely primarily on a set of trans-
parency laws that are on par with most other states in
the IDEA database to provide for public accountabil-
ity, without a heavy state hand in regulating the flow
of money into the party and electoral system.
One purpose of this article was to develop a tax-
onomy of systems that could be used to explain im-
portant political outcomes. When states design and
implement political financing rules, they seek sev-
eral goals, including some or all of the following:
avoiding corruption, reducing the influence of weal-
thy donors, promoting fairness among political par-
ties, and enhancing electoral competition. The
typology we offer might be used in future analysis
to evaluate which kinds of systems advance any of
these goals. Previous work (van Biezen 2015) has
offered a three-dimensional typology (financial re-
strictions, subsidies, transparency), which creates
as many as eight regime types. While conceptually
helpful, it is challenging to link so many regime
types to political outcomes. We argue that collaps-
ing income interventions and subsidies makes
sense conceptually, empirically, and as a practical
manner, in developing regime types for future re-
search. Other measures that use a single dimension
to measure the intensity of regulations (Abel van Es
2016) do not adequately capture the distinctive ap-
proaches to party finance reforms.
The typology we propose can also be applied to
study other campaign-related questions that, in the-
ory, are implicated in the design of finance rules,
such as whether any particular political finance sys-
tem tends to heighten campaign costs,mobilizemore
voters, or complicate matters of enforcement. These
longstanding questions have not been addressed ad-
equately. Policymakers would also benefit from un-
derstanding the trade-offs of selecting from various
approaches to campaign finance reform even if, as
we suggest here, there is a path dependency to
what kinds of regimes states tend to adopt.
In conclusion, this exploratory analysis offers
guidance to understanding current regimes and can
be elaborated and strengthened in future research.
Given the cross-sectional research design we were
not able to assess longitudinal changes in party fi-
nance systems, and hewed closely to the potential im-
pact of long-term institutional factors to explain
reform. Our analysis explicitly did not assess the
implementation of laws, instead focusing on the exis-
tence of particular laws. Identifying the existence of
such laws provides critical information regarding
what governments perceive to be important and how
they signal their intentions; further analysis could use-
fully build on these findings by assessingwhether and
how these regulations are enforced. Although our
findings explained only a portion of the variance in
outcomes, we know from case studies research that
many contextual variables may contribute to the de-
sign of party finance rules. Other information, includ-
ing data on factors such as past political scandals, and
more detailed country-specific information, would
strengthen the analysis. Nonetheless, this large sam-
ple study advances both theoretical understandings
of political reform and conceptual coherence in see-
ing how different states approach the thorny dilemma
of regulating money in politics.
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Appendices
APPENDIX A: DESCRIPTION OF THE
DEPENDENT VARIABLES
The index for intervention is additive and is com-
posed of three equally weighted count variables that
are scaled to range from 0 to 1: limits on the inflow
of money, public financing, and limits on expendi-
tures. The limits count variable contains: ban on for-
eigner contributions, ban on corporate contributions,
ban on government contractor contributions, ban on
union contributions, ban on anonymous contribution
(an outright ban earns a single point, a limitation
earns half a point), a ban on ‘‘other’’ contribution, in-
dividual contribution limits to parties out of the elec-
tion cycle, and individual limits to parties in the
election cycle. The public financing count variable is
composed of: regular party funding, party funding in
campaign cycle, media subsidy, and ‘‘other’’ subsidies.
Finally, the spending limits component is from a single
variable (v31 of IDEA) that indicates a limit on party
spending either in the election season, out of election
season, or both. Let us use the example of Slovenia, a
state with a highly interventionist campaign regime.
Slovenia has enacted bans in all categories of the do-
nations in the scale (foreign, corporate, contractors,
unions, and ‘‘others’’), and it limits anonymous dona-
tions (but does not ban them outright). As such, Sloven-
ia’s funding limit component yields 7.5 points and
scaled down to .9375 (7.5/8). In regards to public fund-
ing, Slovenia has regular funding of parties, media sub-
sidies, ‘‘other’’ subsidies, but it does not award election
specific grants; thus it yields a count of 3, scaled to .75
(3/4). Slovenia also limits the spending amount of par-
ties as defined by IDEA, giving a scaled count of 1.
These counts are then weighted equally on a scale of
0 to 1, giving Slovenia a score of 0.896.
The transparency index is also a count variable
scaled from 0 to 1. It is composed of the following bi-
nary measures: regular finance reports required, cam-
paign finance reports required, reports being public,
donors being public (.5 point for ‘‘sometimes,’’ often
small donor names are not public), enforcement
agency assigned, and an additional agency given en-
forcement authority. Again, consider the case of Slov-
enia, which is a very transparent system. It counts 5.5,
yielding a transparency score of .92, since it has all the
above transparency requirements, except for making
all donor names public.
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Appendix Table B1. Country Classifications
Market Based Public Utility State Coopted Unregulated
Afghanistan - AF Albania - AL Guatemala - GT Antigua and Barbuda - AG
Andorra - AD Argentina - AR Jordan - JO Belarus - BY
Angola - AO Armenia - AM Philippines - PH Botswana - BW
Australia - AU Austria - AT Congo (Brazzaville) - CD Burkina Faso - BF
Bolivia - BO Azerbaijan - AZ Turkey - TR Cambodia - KH
Burundi - BI Bangladesh - BD Cameroon - CM
Ivory Coast - CI Belgium - BE Central African Republic - CF
Congo, Dem Rep of - CD Benin - BJ Denmark - DK
Costa Rica - CR Bhutan - BT Dominica - DM
East Timor - TL Bosnia & Herzegovina - BA El Salvador - SV
Estonia - EE Brazil - BR Gabon - GA
Fiji - FJ Bulgaria - BG Honduras - HN
Finland - FI Canada - CA Iraq - IQ
Germany - DE Chile - CL Jamaica - JM
Ghana - GH Colombia - CO Lebanon - LB
Guinea-Bissau - GW Croatia - HR Lesotho - LS
India - IN Cyprus - CY Liechtenstein - LI
Indonesia - ID Czech Republic - CZ Madagascar - MG
Ireland - IE Ecuador - EC Malawi - MW
Kazakhstan - KZ Ethiopia - ET Mali - ML
Libya - LY France - FR Malta - MT
Maldives - MV Georgia - GE Marshall Islands - MH
Netherlands - NL Greece - GR Mauritius - MU
Niger - NE Guinea - GN Micronesia - FM
Nigeria - NG Hungary - HU Monaco - MC
Norway - NO Iceland - IS Morocco - MA
Papua New Guinea - PG Israel - IL Nauru - NR
Sierra Leone - SL Italy - IT Nicaragua - NI
South Africa - ZA Japan - JP Pakistan - PK
Sudan - SD Kenya - KE Palau - PW
Sweden - SE Korea, Republic of - KR Saint Kitts and Nevis - KN
Uganda - UG Kyrgyzstan - KG Saint Lucia - LC
Ukraine - UA Latvia - LV Seychelles - SC
Venezuela - VE Liberia - LR Swaziland - SZ
Lithuania - LT Switzerland - CH
Luxembourg - LU Turkmenistan - TM
Macedonia - MK Yemen - YE
Mexico - MX Zambia - ZM
Moldova, Republic of - MD Zimbabwe - ZW
Mongolia - MN
Montenegro - ME
Nepal - NP
New Zealand - NZ
Panama - PA
Paraguay - PY
Peru - PE
Poland - PL
Portugal - PT
Romania - RO
Russian Federation - RU
Rwanda - RW
Serbia - RS
Slovakia - SK
Slovenia - SI
Spain - ES
Taiwan - TW
Tajikistan - TJ
Tanzania - TZ
Thailand - TH
Tunisia - TN
United Kingdom - GB
United States - US
Uruguay - UY
Uzbekistan - UZ
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